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Market exposure can favor the evolution of inequity-averse preferences. 
 
The effect stems from an opportunity to obtain information rents. 
 
We offer a new explanation to more sociality observed in market-integrated societies. 
 
We predict a positive relationship between market concentration and sociality. 
Highlights (for review)
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1. Introduction
A high degree of selfishness exhibited by Machiguenga Indians of the Peruvian
Amazon in their play of the ultimatum game set forth the question about the
foundations and evolution of social preferences ubiquitously observed in modern
industrialized societies (Henrich (2000)). Arguably, studying traditional societies
allows us to catch a glimpse of human preferences as of an early stage of social
cohabiting and their evolution. For this purpose, a large project was started to
collect more evidence on the economic behavior of indigenous people from differ-
ent small-scale traditional societies (about the project, see Henrich et al. (2001)
and Henrich et al. (2004)). Among its main findings is that members of market-
integrated societies, as measured by exposure to market exchange, have a stronger
preference for equity than do members of isolated societies.1 Henrich et al. (2004,
p. 50–51) leave open the question of what explains the discovered empirical pat-
tern, calling for more research on this finding:
“The challenge is to understand how and why unselfish behaviors
and motives could evolve in the face of the material advantages accruing
to selfish individuals.”
In this paper, we show how exposure to market exchange can support the evo-
lution of preference for equity of money distribution (Bolton (1991); Fehr and
1In general, there is much evidence on influences of the socioeconomic environment on people’s
preferences. Buchan et al. (2009) find a positive link between a society’s level of globalization and
socialness of its members. Buchan et al. (2002) document cross-cultural differences in people’s
propensity to trust and reciprocate. Herrmann et al. (2008) report a cross-societal variation in
people’s pro- and anti-social punishment behavior revealed in public goods experiments and link
this variation to differences in norms of civic cooperation and the importance of the rule of law
across countries. See also Bowles (1998).
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Schmidt (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)). The idea is that in a market-
integrated society a more equal money distribution can attenuate the scope of
merchants’ price discrimination and, subsequently, improve terms of trade with
them resulting in a higher utility of consumption. Then, with the assumption that
increased utility of consumption means increased individual fitness, inequity-averse
preferences can be individual fitness maximizing and be favored by cultural selec-
tion through enculturation.2 At the same time, in isolated societies this market
effect is absent and selfish preferences would prevail there.
The following example illustrates the idea behind the effect of market expo-
sure. Consider two individuals with an aggregate monetary endowment of 1 and
one profit-maximizing producer of a single, non-divisible good. One individual
is randomly chosen to divide the endowment between himself and the other in-
dividual. Suppose that the resultant distribution of endowment shares is public
information, but individual shares are private information. The producer produces
the good at a constant marginal cost of 0.1. After endowment division, the pro-
ducer sets a price of the good that maximizes her profits from simultaneous trades
with the two individuals. What is the optimal division of the endowment that
maximizes the divider’s consumption of the good? If the divider keeps the whole
endowment for himself, then his consumption is one unit only as the producer sets
the price at 1. Instead, the divider can increase his consumption to two units by
giving the other individual one third of the endowment that makes the producer
set the price at 1/3 aiming at both individuals rather than just at the richer one.
2The importance of the cultural transmission of behavioral traits among humans was empha-
sized by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981). See also Boyd and Richerson (2005). Cultural
transmission leads to a much faster selection for traits and has a similar qualitative character of
evolutionary dynamics as in models with genetical transmission (Bergstrom (2002)).
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Thus, by sharing with others one can increase the purchasing power of one’s
own share, even diminished. This arises from an opportunity to create and ex-
tract information rents. We can think of two approaches to relate this finding
with the phenomenon of inequity aversion. The first is rationalistic. In the ex-
ample, from conventional preferences for consumption we obtain a non-monotonic
indirect utility function of money, which can be interpreted to have underlying
inequity-averse preferences for money distribution. Hence, it may be that inequity
aversion is indistinguishable from rational (in terms of own-consumption maxi-
mization) behavior.3 However, this interpretation is inconsistent with empirical
evidence on people’s behavior in laboratory money-sharing experiments. If people
are that rational to share with others in order to obtain a strategic advantage
for future interactions, then they should also realize that no strategic advantage
can be obtained from sharing in laboratory experiments, which, nevertheless, they
abundantly engage in. This suggests that, when facing a money-sharing decision
to make, people may maximize something else than their utility of consumption.
The second approach, which is also the approach of this paper, is that in so-
cieties exposed to market exchange inequity-averse people can obtain a higher
material payoff than selfish ones. Being more successful, inequity-averse prefer-
ences are likelier to survive evolutionary pressures, and, accordingly, the mode of
behavior induced by these preferences becomes more common in market-integrated
societies. The converse is true for isolated societies that are obsolete in the modern
industrialized world, possibly explaining why we may observe more individualistic
behavior in some traditional societies not observed elsewhere.
In the present paper, these ideas are developed in a model with evolution of
preferences (Gu¨th and Yaari (1992)). In line with the general approach (Ely
3Similarly, Postlewaite (1979) shows the possibility of utility gains from endowment manip-
ulations in competitive markets.
4
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and Yilankaya (2001); Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001); Dekel et al. (2007)), we
distinguish between subjective preferences and objective payoffs. Objective payoffs
are determined by individual evolutionary fitness, which we assume to be the utility
of private consumption. Subjective preferences are defined over the distribution of
endowment shares in the population and individuals maximize these preferences
when confronted with the problem of endowment division. We study the question
the maximization of what subjective preferences also maximizes objective payoffs,
i.e., evolutionary fitness.
Finally, this paper contributes to the evolutionary literature by providing an
empirically supported argument on how non-individualistic preferences can survive
evolutionary pressures in the individual selection framework. Usually, evolutionary
models in favor of non-individualistic preferences rely on a group-selection argu-
ment in the standard approach (for a review, see Bergstrom (2002); Salomonsson
(2010)) or certain informational assumptions about the observability of prefer-
ences in the “indirect” or evolution of preferences approach (Dekel et al. (2007)).
Altruistic preferences are also found to survive evolutionary pressures in local in-
teractions (Eshel et al. (1998)). This paper, however, bypasses all of the above:
the result hinges on the strategic sharing effects described, i.e., information rents.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 deals with objective payoffs in different market structures and
Section 4 with evolutionary stable preferences. Section 5 offers an extension re-
lated to market concentration and preferences. Section 6 discusses robustness and
empirical evidence. The last section concludes.
4Certainly, this paper is not unique in showing how individual selection can favor social
preferences, see, e.g., Becker (1976).
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2. The model
2.1. Set-up
Consider a village of N ≥ 2 farmers, who have an aggregate endowment of a
perfectly divisible local good of size S > 0. Let a vector s = (s1, ..., sN) denote the
farmers’ individual shares of the endowment, where si ∈ [0, S] and Σisi = S.
The consumption of an endowment share si renders the farmer i an objective
utility of u(si), where u
′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. Endowment shares can also be used as
a means of exchange for trades with external merchants if the village is accessible
for them. External merchants can offer farmers a non-divisible outside good in
various quality q > 0. We assume that every farmer has a demand for at most one
unit of the outside good. A farmer i’s objective utility from the consumption of
a variety q when priced at p ≤ si and of the remainder of own endowment share,
si − p, is given by U(si − p, q). The utility function U is increasing and strictly
concave in both arguments and has a positive cross derivative.
Suppose that farmers have subjective preferences over the distribution of en-
dowment shares in the village, characterized for a farmer i by the function Vi
Vi(s) = si −
αi
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
g
(
{sj − si}
+
)
−
βi
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
g
(
{si − sj}
+
)
. (1)
In (1), si is own endowment share, αi ∈ [0, α], 0 < α, and βi ∈
[
0, β
]
, 0 < β, are
subjective preference parameters, where αi ≥ βi, and g is an increasing, strictly
convex function with g(0) = 0. The second term of (1) measures the subjective
utility loss from disadvantageous inequality, and the third term measures the loss
from advantageous inequality.5
5The preference specification (1) is based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The function g imposes
a non-constant marginal rate of substitution between own share and endowment inequality.
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The model contains three stages. In Stage 1, endowment division takes place.
In Stage 2, external merchants offer a menu of different varieties of the outside
good. In Stage 3, trades take place and utilities are realized.
2.2. Endowment division
In Stage 1, Nature randomly selects a farmer i ∈ {1, ..., N} to divide at own
discretion the endowment S into a vector of shares s. The optimal division s∗
maximizing own subjective utility is given by
s∗ = argmaxVi(s). (2)
We can immediately make two observations about s∗. First,
s∗i = max(s
∗), (3)
i.e., the divider’s share has to be the largest. Otherwise, he can increase his utility
by redistributing the difference between the largest share and his own share equally
among all the farmers with lower shares. Second,
s∗j =
S − s∗i
N − 1
, j 6= i. (4)
From the first observation, we can ignore the second term in (1). Then, because
of the strict convexity of g, the maximum of Vi is reached when the remainder of
the endowment is distributed equally among the other farmers.
Thus, the optimal division s∗ is fully characterized by the divider’s own share
s∗i , which, in turn, is determined by his preference parameter βi.
6 We define
ψ :
[
0, β
]
→ [0, S] to be a mapping from βi into the optimal own share s
∗
i . Due
6The parameter α for disadvantageous inequality will be irrelevant for the subsequent analysis
and not be considered henceforth. Yet, by estimating β, we also obtain the lowest bound of α
since αi ≥ βi.
7
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to the convexity of g, the mapping ψ is monotonically decreasing in βi. In order
to have a one-to-one mapping, we assume β such that ψ is a strictly monotone
function with ψ(0) = S and ψ(β) = S/N .
Finally, let the distribution of endowment shares in the village be public infor-
mation, whereas individual shares private.
2.3. Market exchange
In Stage 2, profit-maximizing merchants offer farmers a take-it-or-leave-it menu
of price-quality (p, q) varieties of the outside good. The production of the variety
q > 0 costs C(q), where C ′ > 0, C ′′ > 0, and limq→0C(q) = 0. The returns to
scale from producing a given variety are constant and the total costs of producing
several varieties are additively separable in each variety.
Given a unit demand, a farmer i considers purchasing a variety (p, q) only if it
results in a non-negative net utility level ∆U defined as
∆U(p, q, si) = U(si − p, q)− u(si). (5)
The properties of net utility ∆U are ∆Uq > 0,∆Uqq < 0,∆Usi > 0, and ∆Uqsi > 0,
which immediately follow from the assumptions on U and u. Given a menu of
varieties, a farmer chooses the variety, if any, that maximizes his net utility ∆U .
Finally, farmers have no bargaining power in their trade with merchants.
We consider three different forms of market exchange. The first one is autarky
(the village is not accessible for merchants). The second one is monopoly (the
village is accessible for only one merchant). The third one is perfect competition
(the village is accessible for many merchants).
3. Objective payoffs
In this section, we abstract from farmers’ subjective utility considerations and
are interested in their expected objective utility of consumption, henceforth, objec-
8
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tive payoffs, resulting from different divisions of the endowment. In what follows,
let σi ∈ [0, S] denote the endowment share a farmer i’s keeps for himself if se-
lected to be the divider, with the rest of the endowment, S − σi, divided equally
among the other farmers. For each form of market exchange, we construct a
game with farmers’ objective payoffs and solve for the equilibrium strategy profile
σ = (σ1, ..., σN ).
3.1. Autarky
In the absence of market exchange with external merchants, a farmer i’s ob-
jective payoff from a strategy profile σ is given by
ΠAi (σ) =
1
N
u(σi) +
∑
j 6=i
1
N
u
(
S − σj
N − 1
)
. (6)
The first term is the farmer’s objective utility of own share σi, multiplied by the
probability of being the divider. The second term is the probability-weighted sum
of objective utilities of shares received from the other farmers. Since own strategy
σi has no effect on the second term of Π
A
i , in the autarky game Γ
A = {σi,Π
A
i }
N
i=1
the unique equilibrium strategy for every farmer i is σAi = S.
3.2. Monopoly
To determine farmers’ objective payoffs with monopolist market exchange, first,
we need to solve for the optimal menu of varieties offered by the merchant for
a given distribution of endowment shares. Since individual shares are private
information, the design of a menu of varieties is a hidden-information problem
(Mussa and Rosen (1978)).
As there can be at most two distinct endowment shares resulting from a strategy
σi, denote the larger share by s1 and the smaller by s2. Let pi1 and pi2 denote their
corresponding probabilities in the distribution of the endowment. The merchant
offers at most two varieties {(p1, q1), (p2, q2)} that maximize her expected profit
9
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per trade pi1(p1−C(q1))+pi2(p2−C(q2)) subject to farmers’ incentive compatibility
and individual rationality, respectively,
∆U(pj , qj , sj) ≥ ∆U(pk, qk, sj) (7)
∆U(pj , qj , sj) ≥ 0, j = 1, 2 and k 6= j (8)
where a variety (pj, qj) is aimed at a farmer with the share sj, j = 1, 2.
The merchant offers two distinct varieties if the difference in endowment levels,
s1 − s2, is not too large. Then, the optimal menu {(p1, q1), (p2, q2)} has the in-
dividual rationality constraint of the poor farmer and the incentive compatibility
constraint of the rich farmer binding (the single-crossing property ensures that
the other incentive compatibility constraint holds). In this case, the rich farmer
enjoys a positive information rent, ∆U(p1, q1, s1) > 0, whereas the poor has none,
∆U(p2, q2, s2) = 0. If the difference s1− s2 is sufficiently large or s1 = s2, the mer-
chant designs only one non-zero variety (p1, q1), but for which ∆U(p1, q1, s1) = 0.
Given the merchant’s optimal menu, a farmer’s indirect utility function Y (s)
of own endowment share s is given by
Y (s) =


u(s) if 0 ≤ s < S/N,
u(s) + ∆U(p1, q1, s) if S/N ≤ s ≤ S − (N − 1)s,
u(s) if S − (N − 1)s < s ≤ S,
(9)
where s is the smallest value of s2, determined endogenously, for which poor farm-
ers are offered a non-zero variety. In words, the indirect utility function Y has
three parts. The first part is relevant for the poor farmer, the second for the rich
farmer when poor farmers matter to the monopolist, and the third for the rich
farmer when poor farmers do not matter to the monopolist.
Denote the maximizer of Y over the restriction [S/N, S − (N − 1)s] by
s = argmax(Y (s) | S/N ≤ s ≤ S − (N − 1)s). (10)
10
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The function Y attains its global maximum at either s or S. The condition for
the interior global maximum is
U(s− p1, q1) ≥ u(S). (11)
In the monopoly setting, sharing with others can lead to a higher utility of con-
sumption than when keeping the whole endowment. This effect arises from infor-
mation rents available with less unequal endowment distributions. For condition
(11) to hold, the size of information rent matters, which, on the other hand, is
dependent on the form of the utility function U . Intuitively, condition (11) is like-
lier to hold when farmers after a certain point become quickly satiated with the
consumption of the local good and value the outside good highly enough. (See the
numerical example below that illustrates the points raised.)
A farmer i’s objective payoff from a profile σ is
ΠMi (σ) =
1
N
Y (σi) +
∑
j 6=i
1
N
Y
(
S − σj
N − 1
)
. (12)
In the monopoly game ΓM = {σi,Π
M
i }
N
i=1, the unique equilibrium strategy for
every farmer i is σMi = s if condition (11) holds (also suppose that if we have
Y (s) = Y (S) then farmers prefer the less unequal split), and otherwise σMi = S.
3.3. Perfect competition
In a competitive market, the zero-profit condition implies that p = C(q) for
every variety (p, q) offered. Furthermore, a variety (p, q) aimed at a farmer with
an endowment share s has to maximize the farmer’s utility U(s − p, q), which,
together with p = C(q), implies
U2(s− p, q)− U1(s− p, q)C
′(q) = 0, (13)
where U1 and U2 are partial derivatives with respect to the first and second argu-
ment, respectively. The total derivative of net utility ∆U(p, q, s) with respect to
11
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own endowment share s is (omitting the arguments)
d∆U
ds
= ∆UpC
′dq
ds
+∆Uq
dq
ds
+∆Us = ∆Us > 0, (14)
which is obtained using (13) and ∆Uq = U2 and ∆Up = −U1.
Farmer i’s objective payoff ΠCi from a strategy profile σ is
ΠCi (σ) =
1
N
[u(σi) + ∆U(pi, qi, σi)] +
∑
j 6=i
1
N
[
u(s#j ) + ∆U(pj , qj, s
#
j )
]
, (15)
where s#j = (S−σj)/(N−1), p and q are competitive price and quality levels. Since
∆U increases in own endowment share, in the competition game ΓC = {σi,Π
C
i }
N
i=1
the unique equilibrium strategy is σCi = S.
3.4. Monopoly example
For monopolist market exchange, consider the following specification of the
model : N = 2, S = 50, u(s) = sa, where 0 < a < 1, and U(s − p, q) =
(1 + q)(s − p)a.7 The merchant’s production function is given by C(q) = q2.
Figure 1 plots the indirect utility function Y for different values of a = 0.5, 0.7,
and 0.9. The function Y has an interior maximum and the corner maximum. The
coordinates of the global maximum are given in bold. For lower values of a, i.e.,
when farmers value the local good relatively less, the interior maximum is global.
But for a = 0.9 the interior maximum is not global. In this example, the condition
equivalent to (11), when farmers are better off by sharing with others, is that
a < 0.749.
7With this form of function U we do not have the strict concavity in q assumed in the paper,
but for this example it is immaterial. Otherwise, at the expense of some more computation, we
could have used U(s− p, q) = (1 + q)z(s− p)a for some z, 0 < z < 1.
12
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Figure 1: Indirect utility Y
4. Evolution of preferences
In this section, we address the question of what subjective preferences, char-
acterized by the inequity-aversion parameter β, are favored by cultural selection,
with their share in the population increasing at the expense of other less suc-
cessful preferences. The approach is that of evolution of preferences or “indirect”
evolution with a static stability concept of equilibrium so that in equilibrium no
mutation can give a higher objective payoff than that of the incumbent types
(Gu¨th and Yaari (1992); Ely and Yilankaya (2001)). Based on the results of Ely
and Yilankaya (2001), for different forms of market exchange evolution selects
the subjective preferences that lead to the choice of equilibrium strategies of the
13
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corresponding game Γ. We call these subjective preferences evolutionary stable.8
In each game Γ studied, there is a unique and symmetric equilibrium strategy
σi for every farmer i. The evolutionary stable subjective preference type β is given
then by β = ψ−1(σi), where ψ
−1 is the inverse of the mapping ψ from a preference
type β to the optimal own endowment share. The proposition below summarizes
the resultant evolutionary stable preferences.
Proposition 1. The evolutionary stable preference types are
• in autarky, βA = 0;
• in monopoly, if (11) holds, then βM = ψ−1(s) > 0, where s is defined by
(10), otherwise, βM = 0; and
• in perfect competition, βC = 0.
In words, farmers can gain a material advantage from sharing under monopolist
market exchange. This is due to the opportunity to create and extract information
rents. However, this opportunity is missing in competitive markets and in autarky.
There, we expect selfish types to prevail.
5. Market concentration and preferences
Drawing on Proposition 1, we can postulate a positive relationship between the
degree of market concentration and the intensity of inequity aversion. To study
formally this relationship in our framework, we can proceed as follows. Suppose
8To apply the results of Ely and Yilankaya (2001) directly, we would need to discretize our
model. However, since the existence of equilibrium is not an issue in our games studied, then
the results of Ely and Yilankaya (2001) apply to our setting as well despite a continuous action
space. For pitfalls lying with using continuous action spaces, see Oechssler and Riedel (2002).
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that L ≥ 1 merchants can reach the village and that the probability f(L) of
collusion among the merchants decreases with their number, where f(1) = 1 and
limL→∞ f(L) = 0. If merchants fail to collude, then they are in the state of
perfect competition. Similarly to the previous analysis, for market exchange with
L merchants we define a game ΓL = {σi,Π
L
i }
N
i=1, where a farmer i’s objective
payoff is given by
ΠLi (σ) = f(L)Π
M
i (σ) + (1− f(L))Π
C
i (σ), (16)
where ΠMi and Π
C
i are the objective payoffs in the monopolist and competitive
markets, defined by (12) and (15), respectively. We note that ΠCi (σ) > Π
M
i (σ),
which follows from the consumer surplus in the competitive market being greater
than the information rent in the monopolist market. Clearly, with condition (11)
satisfied, the equilibrium strategy for L = 1 is σLi = s, defined by (10). If s ∈
(S/N, S − (N − 1)s), implying the continuity of the indirect utility Y at s, then
the equilibrium strategy σLi will increase at least for some L. The reason is that
with the competitive market more likely to emerge the divider keeps more of the
endowment to benefit from a higher consumer surplus sacrificing some information
rent in the monopolist market. This implies a lower evolutionary stable preference
parameter βL = ψ−1
(
σLi
)
. Thus, with more competitive markets and, accordingly,
with less price discrimination, income inequality has weaker adverse effects on the
level of consumption utility.
6. Discussion
The main result of this paper is that exposure to markets can support the evolu-
tion of non-individualistic preferences even in the individual selection framework.
Next, we discuss the robustness of this result with regard to different modeling
assumptions. Afterwards, we discuss empirical evidence.
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6.1. Robustness
Regarding endowment division, exposure to market exchange, independently
of the endowment sharing rule, will favor preferences that lead to a more equal
endowment distribution if it results in sufficiently high information rents. But
at the same time, these preferences would not survive in autarky, implying the
relevance of market exposure for the formation of preferences. As for the shar-
ing rule used in the present paper, we essentially claim that even with the most
selfishness-enhancing rule the norm of sharing can still evolve. From a different
perspective, in the presence of positive income redistribution effects we are more
likely to observe the development of pro-social sharing norms.
Regarding the informational assumptions, the private information assumption
is not restrictive. Under complete information, if the monopolist merchant cannot
prevent resale in other markets then he cannot do better than designing the optimal
incentive compatible menu. As for the assumption that endowment distribution
is public information, it is either in the interest of the divider himself to make the
division of the endowment public or, otherwise, poor farmers have no incentive to
conceal the distribution of endowment shares.
Finally, regarding the monopolistic screening, arguably beyond the level of
sophistication of early humans, it is not behind the main result either. Non-
discriminatory pricing, as shown in the introduction, qualitatively leads to the
same result.
6.2. Empirical evidence
As discussed in the introduction, in response to the finding of Henrich (2000),
which proves the behavior of Machiguenga Indians more selfish than typically ob-
served in modern societies, a cross-cultural project was started to inquire into this
finding more thoroughly. In this project, documented in Henrich et al. (2001)
16
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and Henrich et al. (2004), indigenous people from 15 different small-scale soci-
eties from around the world took part in experiments consisting of their playing
ultimatum, public good, and dictator games.
After regressing the measure of sociality on individual and societal character-
istics, several empirical regularities were discovered. First, there is considerably
more behavioral variability across the traditional societies studied than had been
found in any study on modern societies. Second, no individual-level economic or
demographic variable can explain any variation in behavior either within or across
the societies. Lastly, the researchers observed two between-group differences in
people’s behavior. The first one is related to the importance of cooperation in
a society’s economic production and the second to the degree of market integra-
tion (as measured, primarily, by exposure to external markets). Both factors are
positively related to the amount of sociality exhibited and together they account
for about a half of its variation across societies with each of these factors equally
important.
These findings are based on the results of the regression run using the pooled
data from all the societies studied in the project. The finding that there is a
positive link between market integration and amount of sociality, with causation
running from market integration, is also supported by an individual study within
this project. Ensminger (2004) is a study on the society of Orma of East Africa,
which has a significant variation in market involvement among its different societal
groups. One of the specific questions raised in this study is whether there is an
effect of market integration on fairness norms (mean offers in the experimental
games conducted) of the Orma people. Ensminger (2004) finds a strong positive
effect and concludes that the behavior of the Orma people is consistent with the
general finding of the project that fairness increases with market integration. In
particular, it is suggested that fairness is learned in the course of market exchange
17
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and these socializing effects of the market permeate other spheres of everyday life.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we show how inequity-averse preferences can survive evolutionary
pressures in societies exposed to market exchange. We argue that the effect of
market exposure on the evolution of preferences arises from an opportunity to
extract information rents. Our results offer a new explanation to the empirical
finding of Henrich et al. (2001) and Henrich et al. (2004) about more sociality
observed in market-integrated societies. We also predict a positive relationship
between the degree of market concentration and amount of sociality.
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